Should a common central bank in a heterogeneous monetary union base its decisions on EU-wide averages of economic variables or on national welfare losses? A central bank that minimizes the sum of national welfare losses reacts less to common shocks. Under certain parameter constellations this leads to higher average union-wide expected welfare and it might thus be preferable that decisionmaking is dominated by national representatives. Countries with a transmission mechanism far from the average benefit from an orientation on national welfare losses. For countries with a transmission mechanism close to the average, welfare can be lower in this case.
INTRODUCTION
In any monetary union there will be differences between regions in terms of economic performance. Should the monetary authority react to these divergences? For Europe, i.e. the euro area, the standard answer is no: the European Central Bank (ECB) is held responsible for the average performance of the entire euro zone. However, as in some countries the performance starts to diverge considerably from the average this answer appears superficial. It is not satisfactory because it does not take into account that the EU was created to serve the interests of its member states, which remain the basic political units in Europe. This differentiates the euro area from nation states, even very federally organized ones, in which the main political unit coincides with the monetary union. Therefore, countries whose performance is far away from the average might not be served appropriately by such a policy.
The issue of what should be the political unit whose welfare should be taken into account by the ECB is important because welfare is usually assumed to be a convex function of economic performance. To use a concrete example: imagine a monetary union of two regions/countries of equal size. If one assumes, as usual, that the welfare of each region/country is a quadratic function of one variable, say unemployment, the average welfare of the two regions will fall as the standard deviation increases (for any given mean). If (national) welfare loss (unemployment) 2 and if the two countries have unemployment rates equal to d and Àd (so that the average is equal to zero) the average welfare loss is equal to d 2 .
Average welfare losses thus increase with the dispersion of unemployment. But in a monetary union it is impossible to have a nationally differentiated monetary policy. One is thus tempted to conclude that the ECB might bemoan national divergences within the euro area, but that there is nothing it could or should do about them. This conclusion is, however, rash if one admits that monetary policy involves, at least in the short run, a tradeoff between two policy goals, for example, inflation and employment, and that the central bank takes both into account. Extreme values of national unemployment rates loom larger in the objective function because they are squared. Referring to the problems the ECB is facing currently the question is thus whether the unemployment rate of Spain (which is about one-half higher than the euro area average) should be considered as just one element in the calculation of the average area-wide unemployment or whether one should consider the high welfare losses it causes in Spain separately. The situation in Spain would presumably affect decisions by the ECB much more under the second approach.
The deeper issue is thus what should the ECB do when one size clearly does not fit all? Should it base its decisions on the area-wide averages of unemployment, or should it attempt to minimize the (weighted) average of national welfare losses resulting from actual national unemployment rates? In this paper, we aim to provide a first step towards an answer by showing to what extent these two choices would lead to different policies in a world where the preferences of policy-makers are identical, but where there are differences in the monetary transition mechanism.
Our paper is related to the literature in several aspects. Most of the literature on monetary policy within a monetary union has usually assumed that the common central bank bases its decision only on union-wide state variables (Alesina and Grilli, 1992) . Alternatively, the literature on central bank constitutions for monetary unions assumes the same for the centrally appointed members of the decision-making body whereas the representatives appointed by the constituting regions of the monetary union are assumed to look only at the welfare losses of their home region (von Hagen and Su È ppel, 1994; Aksoy et al., 2002) . The focus there is under what circumstances what kind of governing body would yield higher welfare.
Although we are not primarily concerned with the issue of the organizational structure, our results concerning the policy a common central bank should follow have some implications for this issue as well. This is because a homogeneous body of EU-appointed decision-makers would presumably be more likely to look only at area-wide variables than an executive board which consists of national representatives. Closest to our work is a paper by de Grauwe (2000) who has developed a two-country model similar to ours and uses simulation analysis to arrive at similar conclusions as we do. We derive general analytical results in a multi-country setting.
The remainder is organized as follows: the next section presents the model used for the analysis. Purposely, we use a standard model because we want to draw attention to the general point that there is a difference between area-wide welfare based on the (weighted) area-wide averages of national performances and the average area-wide welfare based on (also weighted) national welfare, which arises in the standard approach but has been neglected so far. Section 3 calculates the policy resulting under both choices (in the form of reaction functions), while Section 4 draws welfare conclusions. Section 5 summarizes and offers some policy conclusions.
THE MODEL
We use a standard model, based on the usual two building blocks, a labour demand function and a welfare function defined over inflation and employment. We assume that there are j 1Y F F F Y N member countries in the monetary union.
Labour demand in country j is given as
where 4 j is a pure national shock with E4 0 and E4 2 j ' 2 4 j . As the 4 j 's represent national asymmetric shocks we assume that the covariances among them are equal to zero. To the extent that the national shocks are correlated their covariance should show up in a higher variance of the common shock 4 EU .
The parameter j measures the employment effects of monetary policy in country j. There is, in addition, an area-wide common shock 4 EU with E4 EU 0 and E4 2 EU ' 2 4 EU that affects all countries equally. It could best be thought of as a worldwide commodity shock, a global recession, or a shock to the external exchange rate. We assume that the common shock is not correlated to national shocks E4 j 4 EU 0.
Preferences of the (welfare-maximizing) authorities are formulated as a per period loss function. This loss is specified (all variables are expressed as logs) in the usual way:
where b is the relative weight country j puts on the employment aim, k j expresses the level of distortions on the labour market. Employment is below its potential owing to the influence of strong labour unions that use their ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 power to push wages above the market-clearing level (Barro and Gordon, 1983) . If labour unions are characterized by a separation into insiders and outsiders, the former will set wages too high for full employment (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988) .
All of this is standard, and so is the problem for the monetary authority, namely to minimize the one-period loss. We emphasize that the parameter b does not have a subscript because we assume that preferences (i.e. inflation aversion) are identical in all countries. We want to see whether divergences in national performance should influence the decisions of the ECB even if preferences are identical.
MONETARY POLICY
We now proceed to calculate the optimal monetary policy under two different assumptions about the objective of the ECB. It could either minimize the (weighted) average of national losses, or alternatively minimize the loss function calculated at the euro-area level, using the (weighted) averages of national inflation rates and output gaps as input. The first case could represent the case where national representatives determine monetary policy. Assuming that they care only for their national developments, each of them would look at national welfare losses. Simply summing up these objective functions would yield such an average. The second case would be the case where the ECB board adopts a truly European perspective by looking only at EMU-wide averages. Notice that the first case is also compatible with a homogeneous body of policy-makers who, however, take national developments more into account than simple averaging implies.
Minimizing national welfare losses
The union monetary authority maximizes the weighted average of national utilities. This leads to the following programme:
where the relative weight of country j is " j , with j " j 1. In equation (3) we have already used the fact that in our one good model inflation is the same all over the monetary union. This implies that our model cannot replicate one of the problems facing the ECB, namely divergences in national inflation rates. Different national inflation rates could, for example, arise in a model with tradable and non-tradable goods, or if the central bank does not directly control the rate of inflation but uses an interest rate rule as in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) or Aksoy et al. (2002) . We abstract from this complication and assume that the central bank is able to set inflation directly. Obviously, the alternative approach would be much more realistic but we consider it worthwhile to begin with a simpler framework. It is likely that allowing for different rates of inflation would only strengthen our results, however.
Using (1) in (3) and minimizing this expression with respect to the (common) rate of inflation, the first-order condition is:
The expected rate of inflation is thus % e b j " j j k j . We can now calculate the actual rate of inflation by using this result in the first-order condition:
For convenience we define a new aggregate shock which consists of the sum of the common shock 4 EU and the average national shock j " j 4 j : $ 4 EU j " j 4 j . To simplify notation, we further define an average : j " j j "
. Solving for the rate of inflation yields
where the superscript N denotes the case of monetary policy based on national welfare. Inflation is increasing in the size of the distortion in all member economies (the inflation bias) and in response to an aggregate shock.
Minimizing area-wide welfare losses based on national performance
Alternatively, the ECB might base its decision on an area-wide utility function which uses the averages of national rates of employment and inflation as input. The problem then becomes:
Substituting in equation (1) 
Differentiating this expression with respect to the rate of inflation, gives the first-order condition
where we have again used the fact that j " j 1, the definition of $, and introduced the notation j " j k j " k. In this case, % e bk, so that the rate of inflation set by the ECB becomes
with A 1a1 b " 2 and where the superscript A denotes the case of monetary policy being tailored to area-wide averages of national performances. Inflation is again increasing in the average size of the distortion in the member economies (the inflation bias) and in response to an aggregate shock.
A comparison of inflation rates
In the next step, we explore what influence the difference in the objective function of the central bank in the two alternative cases would have. Comparing equations (4) and (6) reveals that the difference between the two solutions stems from two sources. First, the inflation bias, resulting from the aggregation of national distortions, is different in the two cases. However, the terms k and j " j j k j are linked through the relation between the j 's and the k j 's: j " j j k j Yk k. 1 The second difference in the two solutions, the term denoting the reaction of the common monetary policy to the aggregate shock, lies in the difference between the terms b " 2 and b j " j 2 j . They are linked by:
2 . 2 With this notation, the rate of inflation, when the central bank cares about national welfare, can be rewritten
1. Define j " j j À " k j À " k Yk and multiply this out to see that j " j j k j Yk k.
2.
Define j " j j À " 2 2 . Multiply out this expression and notice that À2 j " j j " j " j " 2 À" 2 . Thus j " j 2 j 2 " 2 .
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Comparing equations 4 H and (6) shows that N`A since 2 is positive. Given these results, we can compare the rates of inflation in the two cases
The first term on the RHS gives the difference in trend inflation. Its sign cannot be determined a priori. It is thus not possible to say in general whether a central bank which addresses its policy to national objectives will produce a higher or lower inflation bias. We suspect that it is likely that there is a negative relation between the effectiveness of monetary policy and the level of distortions; i.e. Yk 0 is likely to hold in reality. The argument for this presumption is quite simple: in a country where trade unions succeed in holding real wages high the parameter measuring the distortion in labour markets, k, is likely to be large. But if trade unions care strongly about real wages monetary policy cannot have a strong impact on output (as most of the impact of a monetary expansion will just go into prices and wages). 3 It is thus likely that a central bank which looks at national welfare levels will produce a lower inflationary bias.
A central bank that minimizes (the average of national) welfare losses will always stabilize aggregate shocks less (the second term being positive) because such a central bank will take into account that the impact of monetary policy differs in the member countries. For some countries much less monetary policy is necessary to stabilize shocks, whereas for others more is needed. But with one common monetary policy, the central bank is required to balance these influences, leading in the end to the result that common shocks are stabilized less because a stronger reaction would hurt some countries more than they would gain. In other words, the ECB becomes more cautious in using monetary policy to stabilize shocks.
As differences in the transmission mechanism play a key role in our results, the question thus arises: how important are these in reality? The literature on this point is difficult to interpret because the underlying question has usually been different from ours. Some maintain the differences in the transmission mechanism are so large that they will make the operation of EMU difficult. Cecchetti (1999) reports evidence which suggests that the differences in the output multiplier of monetary policy are considerable, with the highest coefficient being over three times larger than the lowest. Others argue that these differences are owing to differences in financial structures, which will diminish over time as countries share a common monetary policy (Dornbusch et al., 1998) . Most empirical studies concur, however, that at present there are still large differences in the transmission mechanism, although they are difficult to estimate precisely (see e.g. Borio, 1995; Gerlach and Smets, 1995;  3.
See Appendix A for an example in which the relation between j and k j is explicitly derived.
ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 Eijffinger and de Haan, 2000 ; and the survey by Angeloni et al., 2001) . And even if one might reasonably expect that these differences will become smaller over time, at present they still exist. 4 One might also expect that these differences gain in importance with an eventual enlargement of the EMU.
A WELFARE COMPARISON
Having derived the difference in inflation and in the stabilization of shocks under the two alternative objective functions for the common central bank, it remains to be seen what welfare implications this would have.
Given that the comparison of welfare under the alternative regime should be done on an ex-ante basis, we concentrate on expected welfare losses. We start with an evaluation of the average welfare of all union members. 5 In the case that the common central bank cares for averages, we have expected losses for the entire union of (after using equation (1) to substitute out for employment):
which can be rewritten, by multiplying out the quadratic terms as
where the last term, the variance of the aggregate common shock, can be written as E$ 2 ' 2 4 EU ' 2 4 aN if all countries are of equal size, and the number of countries is indicated by N. For a sufficiently large number of member countries the variance of the aggregate common shock will thus be dominated by its area-wide component.
Likewise, the expected loss under the alternative is
The difference is thus 4. One could argue that not addressing these differences when setting monetary policy the incentives for convergence would be strengthened.
5.
EMU-wide welfare is the simple weighted sum of national welfare levels, defined in (2).
This can be rewritten, by using the definitions made above, as
Whether the members of the monetary union are, on average, better off under a common central bank which minimizes national welfare losses depends on the sign of the two terms in this equation. Inspection of the curly brackets shows that the first term in (10) is negative for b close to zero and has to become positive for some values of b. 6 This first result is not surprising: the average of national welfare losses in terms of unemployment (b is the weight of employment in the loss function) should be lower under a central bank that explicitly attempts to minimize them than under a central bank that does not.
What is not so evident is that, under this parameter constellation, the gain from having the ECB look at national losses is increasing in the variance of the aggregate shock ' 2 $ . As we have already argued above, this reflects the fact that the ECB now takes into account that different countries have a different need for active monetary policy in reaction to an aggregate shock. It will therefore stabilize less which is beneficial for the average country. Obviously, the gain from this regime is thus larger the higher the variance of the common shock. The effect is strengthened if the dispersion of the j 's increases (i.e. if 2 is high).
The second term expresses the fact that the inflation bias might be higher whenever the central bank cares about area-wide average variables, rather than national welfare. This second term constitutes a quadratic expression in Yk , the cross-country relation between the effectiveness of monetary policy and the labour market distortions. The form of this expression implies that if these two variables are not correlated (i.e. for Yk 0), the inflation bias has no bearing on the choice discussed here. Very high values of Yk (in absolute terms) make it likely that looking at average area-wide performance is better. But within the range À2k ! Yk ! 0 6.
However, the relationship is not monotonous. Within an intermediate range an increase in b leads to a fall in the value of the 's that might be large enough so that the expression in the curly brackets falls again with a higher b.
the part of the welfare loss that is due to the inflation bias would be lower under a common central bank that looks at national performance.
The following factors thus make it likely that average welfare is higher under a central bank that looks at national welfare (instead of average area-wide variables): (i) a high weight for unemployment in the loss function, (ii) a high variance of asymmetric shocks (if the first condition is satisfied), and (iii) à moderate' negative correlation between the distortions that keep unemployment above the natural level and the short-run effectiveness of monetary policy in influencing output. 7 However, even if on average union member countries are better off under a common central bank that looks at national welfare, this does not necessarily imply that every country is better off in this situation.
Dropping the summation in (10), the welfare comparison for any single country yields:
For any individual country, the welfare difference under two policy options for the common central bank remains thus the sum of the differences in the inflation bias and the stabilization to common shocks. The inflation bias term is unchanged, and remains, as discussed above, a function of the relation Yk . Given that we do not have any information about this relation, except for our presumption, it seems more promising to focus on the stabilization role of monetary policy and ask how the transmission mechanism determines under which regime a country would fare better. We thus set Yk 0 and focus on the first term in (11). 8 Obviously, this is a function of j only. We begin by setting j 0, in which case the first term would clearly be positive given that A b N . The country would hence gain if the central bank would care for national welfare. Since monetary policy in this country is assumed to be ineffective j 0 it loses from an active monetary policy because inflation variability would increase without any gain in terms of lower output variability. Thus, the less the 7.
Notice that for this welfare comparison we have assumed that the weight of the country in the average welfare is the same that the ECB assigns to them. This need not be the case; for instance, countries might be more or less important in the ECB council than justified by their`objective' importance in the EU (as e.g. based on population size). Appendix B discusses the case in more detail. We are grateful to one of our referees for bringing this point to our attention. 8.
This might not be far from reality for the euro area. A simple calculation using data for transmission mechanism (Cecchetti, 1999) and estimates of NAIRU's (taken from McMorrow and Roeger, 2000) yields a correlation of zero. This is different from what we would expect from the simple theoretical model presented in the annex. One explanation for this is that there are obviously more influences on the transmission mechanism than only labour markets. common central bank stabilizes, the better it is for such a country. The same is true if j 3 I because then the first term would also be clearly positive. In this case monetary policy would be super-effective and the country would prefer a less stabilizing central bank as moderate monetary policy would be sufficient. Otherwise, output variability would increase by too much for this country. The condition for the national regime to be preferable for country j condition is EL A j b EL N j , which is equivalent to
Hence, the regime preferred by country j is a non-linear function of its own j . The critical j , at which the country is just indifferent between the ECB's objective function, is thus implicitly determined by:
There are two solutions for j that fulfil this condition. 9 For low as well as for high values of j a central bank that cares for national welfare losses is preferable. For intermediate values of j , a central bank that looks at averages is preferable. Then the country's transmission mechanism is close to that of the average and thus such a regime is preferable.
CONCLUSIONS
We have found that it makes a difference whether the central bank of a monetary union bases its decisions on the average values of inflation and employment for the entire area, or whether it recognizes that differences in national performance can lead potentially to large differences in national welfare and therefore tries to minimize the average of national welfare. A central bank which minimizes the (weighted) average of national welfare will clearly stabilize less than a central bank concerned with only union-wide developments would do. It might, on the other hand, also produce a higher inflation bias depending on the relation between the transmission mechanism and the distortions in member countries. Average welfare actually increases if the variance of common shocks increases. This is because the central bank takes into account that stabilization might be too strong for some countries (e.g. those with strong transmission mechanisms). This is the reason for the somewhat counter-intuitive result that less stabilization might actually be welfare increasing.
9.
To find the maximum of the function j a1 2 j , set the derivative equal to zero and find the maximum at j 1.
It is worthwhile to emphasize that our results are completely independent from two issues that usually come up in any discussion of national divergences within EMU. First, whether and how the ECB should weigh the variables from member countries when it calculates area-wide averages (i.e. population or GDP weights). And second, whether different countries have different preferences concerning the tradeoff between output and inflation, an issue that much dominated public discussion in countries like Germany. We have explicitly assumed that preferences are the same in all countries, reflecting the evidence that preferences seem to have converged over the last decades (Collins and Giavazzi, 1993; Hayo, 1998) .
Our main policy conclusion is that the injunction that the ECB should look only at area-wide variables is unlikely to be useful in many cases. How could this best be achieved? If one assumes that the governors of national central banks care mainly about national welfare then it might be good that they dominate the ECB's decision-making mechanism (at least numerically, as there are 12 of them compared to only six members that are nominated at the EU level).
It has to be acknowledged, though, that our results are driven by the assumption that there are important differences in the transmission of monetary policy in member countries. Their existence has been amply documented. But a gradual convergence, that can be reasonably expected, would over time erode the differences we have discussed. For the time being, however, and with a view to the enlargement of EMU, differences in the transmission will persist for some time.
Another, somewhat deeper, issue that remains unresolved in our view is that of the foundation of the aggregate welfare functions used in most policy analysis. The basis for a national welfare function is usually the assumption that all agents within one country are in the same situation so that one can think of a country as being populated by one representative agent. This assumption becomes probably even more problematic, than it is already in the standard national context, when one considers the euro area because the euro area is even more heterogeneous than even large member countries. Moreover, at the national level preferences can be mediated via a single integrated political system. This is much less the case in the EU, which does not constitute a political union.
APPENDIX A: AN EXAMPLE FOR THE RELATION BETWEEN j AND k j
In this appendix we derive the connection between distortions and the transmission mechanism explicitly. We begin with labour demand and the endogenous amount of distortion in the labour market. The productive sector in each country is represented by a Cobb±Douglas technology
where the capital stock K is constant and normalized to one. Labour N is employed by profit-maximizing firms to the point where its marginal productivity is equal to the real wage
where W i and P i denote the national wage and price levels respectively. We normalize P jYÀ1 . Lowercase letters denote natural logarithms, and parameters are constant and positive; % denotes inflation and therefore the logarithm of the current price level. Taking natural logs, labour demand becomes
where " n j is the full employment level. Thus, labour demand is falling in real wages, resulting in employment below full employment. We assume that labour supply is inelastic. Hence the level of employment is determined by the labour demand schedule. Note that we assumed that the reaction of labour demand to real wages is the same as the slope of the Phillips curve j .
Next we assume that preferences of all national labour union members are identical, and since firms produce a homogeneous good, this allows us to represent them by a single union that covers the whole country and maximizes the objectives of a representative union member. His or her objectives are given over real wages w j À % j and a deviation of employment from full employment n j À " n j 2 . Our assumptions are reflected in the following utility function for the labour union in country j: U j j w j À % j À 1 2 n j À " n j 2 j measures the degree of union aggressiveness that is, for instance, determined by the influence of the group of insiders in the labour union (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988) . Given this utility function, we can derive the wage demand of the labour union by maximizing this function with respect to w j as w j % j a 2 j , leading to an employment level of n j " n j À j a j . Next we use this set-up to show that one can also directly link the j 's and k j 's. Thus, we explicitly relate the efficiency of monetary policy in country j j with the level of distortion in country j k j . We define k j " n j À n j and normalize the (log of) full employment level to zero to have finally j k j j which inversely relates the slope of the Phillips curve to the level of distortions in each country. In this set-up the term k would thus be negative.
ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 Intuitively this can be understood as follows. Assume, for example, that the distortions which are responsible for the fact the output is below its potential are owing to distortions in the labour market. The power of labour unions pushes the wage level above its market-clearing level; as a consequence employment is lowered. The level of distortions must be considered as endogenous because it is owing to the influence of labour unions, and the latter will take into account how monetary policy affects output. The more monetary policy can achieve in stimulating output, the less incentives there are to avoid distortions. Thus, the endogenous determined amount of distortions in an economy is inversely related to the effectiveness of monetary policy.
APPENDIX B: DIFFERENT WEIGHTS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE ECB COUNCIL AND IN THE WELFARE COMPARISON
Our standard case is that the welfare comparison is based on equations (10) and 10 H . Assuming that the weight in the welfare function of the union is different from that assigned by the ECB to country j, we might consider the following alternative weighting scheme for the welfare comparison. Let, instead of " j , 0 j be the weight of country j, where 0 j is for instance the relative population size of country j. Analogue to equation (10) we have
which can be rewritten as
Using the definitions j 0 j j and j 0 j 2 j 2 2 the expression becomes
Notice that the different aggregation scheme has no influence on the distribution of the j so that 2 is unaffected. A comparison between 10 H and this equation shows that EL A À EL N 0 j b EL A À EL N " j if
The interpretation of this comparison is straightforward. If the countries with a highly effective transmission of monetary policy have a larger weight in the welfare function for the EU than in the objective function of the ECB, average welfare for the EMU is increased because it benefits them if the ECB takes their effective monetary policy into account. This is particularly important if the reaction to shocks is large. This confirms our earlier result that it is welfare increasing if the ECB takes highly effective monetary policy into account. This gain increases welfare if countries with an effective monetary policy play a more important role in the welfare comparison.
